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Procedural fairness and regularity are indispensable to the essence
of liberty. 23 This fairness must not be abrogated or balanced away
merely because an attorney refuses to answer all questions asked him
at disciplinary proceedings. Rather than affording overzealous bar
examiners the opportunity of reaching arbitrary results, this decision
should encourage more definitive standards for assessing an attorney's
ethical or professional qualifications. As Mr. Justice Fortas noted,
the special responsibilities assumed by an attorney as licensee of the
state and officer of the court "do not carry with them a diminution,
24
however limited, of his Fifth Amendment rights.."
The determination of moral fitness by licensing and disciplinary
proceedings is a grave responsibility by reason of the inherent public
trust placed in attorneys as officers and servants of our courts and
judicial system. The duty of protecting society from unqualified and
ethically inept lawyers, however, does not carry with it the power to
undermine summarily an attorney's rights under the fifth amendment.
The humiliation, degradation, and penalty of disbarment is far more
damaging to an attorney than is dismissal to a public employee; this
disparity therefore warrants the existence of separate constitutional
standards.
DONALD

J.

HALL

DIVORCE: THE EFFECT OF A BIGAMOUS REMARRIAGE ON
ALIMONY FROM A PREVIOUS HUSBAND
Reese v. Reese, 192 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1966)
A divorced husband petitioned for termination of alimony payments, alleging that his former wife had remarried. The wife's remarriage was, however, bigamous, although she was without knowledge of this defect. The Circuit Court for Dade County consequently
terminated alimony payments. The District Court of Appeal for the
23. Shaughnessy v. United States ex reL Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224 (1953).
24. 87 Sup. Ct. 625, 630-31 (1967).
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Third District affirmed,1 and on certiorari, the Florida Supreme
Court HELD, that a bigamous remarriage, being void ab initio, could
not terminate the right to alimony under an earlier divorce decree.
Judgment reversed, Chief Justice Thornal, Justices Caldwell and
Thomas dissenting.
A divorced wife's valid remarriage will relieve her former husband
from alimony obligation.2 Many jurisdictions, however, adhere to the
position that a bigamous marriage is absolutely invalid. 3 Under this
rationale a divorced husband is not relieved of alimony obligations
when his former wife enters into a bigamous relationship, since the
ceremony does not constitute a valid remarriage. 4 Conversely, since
alimony obligations still flow from the initial marriage, there is no
right to alimony from the invalid bigamous relationship.
In some jurisdictions, however, even a bigamous marriage has certain attributes of legality. Courts have recognized that it may be
inequitable to penalize a blameless woman and allow the guilty husband to escape alimony obligations. 5 If a bigamous marriage is completely void, the innocent wife has no remedy against her bigamous
husband.6 Further, any children born of the void marriage are illegitimate. 7 By recognizing some aspects of legality in a bigamous marriage, courts can protect an innocent party from "the odium of immorality and nullity.... 8
The Florida statutes list bigamy as a ground for divorce." Other
states with similar statutes have held that there is no objection to the
employment of divorce procedure as a mechanism to accomplish the
dissolution of a bigamous marriage.1o The inclusion of such a ground
refutes the contention that a divorce is available only to dissolve valid
marriages.11 Further, where the state has such a statute, the remedial
I. Reese v. Reese, 178 So. 2d 913 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
2. Chaachou v. Chaachou, 135 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1961); Carlton v. Carlton, 87
Fla. 460, 100 So. 745 (1924). This rule is, of course, only applicable to installment
alimony obligations and does not extend to lump sum alimony obligations.
3. E.g., Cartwright v. McGowen, 121 Ill. 388, 12 N.E. 737 (1887); Stewart v.
Vanderwort, 34 W. Va. 524, 12 S.E. 736 (1890).
4. See Cartwright v. McGowen, 121 Ill.
388, 12 N.E. 737 (1887).
5. Young v. Young, 97 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1957).
6. See Abelt v. Zeman, 86 Ohio L. Abs. 109, 173 N.E.2d 907 (C.P. 1961).
7. Todd v. Todd, 151 Fla. 134, 9 So. 2d 279 (1942).
8. Worman v. Worman, 113 Fla. 233, 235, 152 So. 435, 436 (1953) (concurring
opinion).
9. "No divorce shall be granted unless one of the following facts shall appear
(9) That either party had a husband or wife living at the time of the
marriage sought to be annulled." FLA. STAT. §65.04(9) (1965). See generally
Annot., 3 A.L.R.3d 1108 (1965).
10. Leckney v. Leckney, 26 R.I. 441, 59 At. 311 (1904).
11. Reese v. Reese, 128 Kan. 762, 28 Pac. 751 (1929).
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incidents of a divorce, such as alimony may be applicable, even
though the marriage was invalid. 2 Therefore, the Florida statutes
would seem to recognize implicitly that certain legal obligations arise
from a bigamous relationship.
Prior to the present case the Florida decisions have uniformly
adopted the proposition that alimony obligations may arise from a
bigamous relationship. 3 In Young v. Young 4 the court recognized
that Florida law includes bigamy as a ground for divorce and that
alimony may be granted if a divorce is available on statutory grounds.
Since the legislature recognized such a ground, the court concluded
that it would "make such orders with reference to allowances for the
wife as fit the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the
case."15
In Burger v. Burger'6 the court clarified its interpretation of the
problem. Where a wife is an innocent victim of a bigamous husband's
wrong, the court may allow permanent alimony and attorneys' fees

against the bigamous husband. Although dicta, the above language
is an express recognition that alimony may be an incident of a
bigamous marriage where the wife is the innocent victim of her presumed husband's fraud. The implication is that the bigamist may
not set up his own fraud as a defense against the wife's petition for
divorce and alimony. The reasoning of the Burger decision was
specifically applied in Brown v. Brown,'7 a 1965 decision. Applying
the older doctrine, the lower court refused to grant alimony because
it considered a bigamous marriage void.'8 The Florida Supreme Court
reversed the decision and remanded the case to decide whether the
wife was an innocent victim of her presumed husband's wrong and
therefore entitled to permanent alimony.
The Young, Burger, and Brown cases concerned an attempt to
obtain divorce and alimony from a bigamous husband. In these cases
the court apparently rejected the old doctrine that a bigamous marriage creates no enforceable legal obligations. In the present case the
court was faced with a variant fact situation. Here the innocent victim of a bigamous relationship had elected to forfeit her rights
against the bigamous husband. Instead, she was attempting to retain
alimony from a former husband. The issue before the court was the
12. See Abelt v. Zeman, 86 Ohio L. Abs. 109, 173 N.E.2d 907 (C.P. 1961);
Leckney v. Leckney, 26 RI. 441, 59 At. 311 (1904).
13. See Brown v. Brown, 186 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1966); Burger v. Burger, 166 So.
2d 433 (Fla. 1964); Young v. Young, 97 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1957).
14. 97 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1957).
15. Id.at 471.
16. 166 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1964).
17. 186 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1966).
18. Brown v. Brown, 179 So. 2d 622 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
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effect of the doctrine announced in Young, Burger; and Brown on this
type of fact situation.
The district court in the present case applied Young, Burger, and
Brown, but with an eye to the form, not the substance, of the earlier
holdings. The district court reasoned that since the wife was innocent
she could claim permanent alimony from the bigamous husband. The
court considered it fundamental that she could not receive alimony
from both husbands, nor could she be allowed to choose the more
profitable. The bigamous marriage was therefore effective to terminate the alimony from the former husband.
In reversing the district court, the Florida Supreme Court held
that a bigamous marriage is void and ineffective to alter the legal
rights of the wife vis-A-vis her former husband. The court relied on
Dawson v. Dawson,19 a district court case, in which it was held that
there was no right to alimony when the marriage was initially invalid.
The Dawson case was, however, an action for alimony unconnected
with divorce.20 In this context, alimony is awarded when married
couples are living apart and the wife wishes to obtain separate maintenance, but not a final divorce. 21 Since the parties remain married
by the terms of the statute, it is only logical that this form of alimony
be grounded on a valid marriage.
The Dawson decision is not only questionable precedent but also
dangerous in that it applies the old doctrine that the wife of a bigamous husband has no divorce or alimony rights against him. The court
cites Dawson for this proposition and in so doing calls into question
its own holdings in Young, Burger, and Brown. The court apparently
did not realize that these three cases could have been followed in
the present case without changing the actual result.
In Young, Brown and Burger the innocent wife was attempting
to collect alimony from the bigamous husband. In these cases the court
indicated that it would not allow a bigamous husband to set up his
own fraud in order to defeat the rights of an innocent wife. In the
present case the wife elected to retain alimony from the former husband.2 2 If the bigamous husband's fraud cannot destroy the innocent
wife's legal rights as against him, it is equally logical that it cannot
destroy her rights against a former husband. The obligation incurred
by the former husband remains, despite the fraud of a third party,
as long as the wife is innocent. In effect, this bigamous marriage
19.
20.

164 So. 2d 536 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
This action is based on FLA. STAT. §65.09 (1965).

21. Preston v. Preston, 116 Fla. 246, 157 So. 107 (1934).
22. In fact, there was no real opportunity for election because the bigamous
husband committed suicide a day and one-half after the marriage. Consequently
the wife could not get alimony payments from him.
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